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Shifting the E-Discovery Solution: Why




The amount of electronically stored information in the United States
doubles every 18-24 months, and 90 percent of U.S. corporations are
currently engaged in some kind of litigation. These factors, combined
with the new way we store our information, have turned discovery into a
complicated and expensive process.
In response, parties have attempted to pass these costs off to the
non-prevailing party as court costs under 28 U.S.C § 1920 ("Section
1920"), which enumerates six items that can be awarded as court costs.
The U.S. Courts of Appeals are split regarding the interpretation of
Section 1920. If the statute is interpreted broadly, a variety of e-
discovery tasks, ranging from hiring outside counsel to creating
litigation-related databases, can be properly awarded as costs. If the
statute is read more narrowly, however, courts will limit the type of e-
discovery costs that can be awarded under the language of the statute,
which will reduce e-discovery court costs.
This Comment will describe the current state of the circuit split and
discuss the various approaches to interpreting Section 1920. This
Comment will then describe the Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.
case in detail and analyze how the case's dicta might affect the e-
discovery court costs debate. Finally, this Comment will propose a
judicial test for interpreting Section 1920 in a uniform manner. This
Comment ultimately urges the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene and
mandate such a test.
* Juris Doctor Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2014. Bachelor of Journalism, University of Texas at Austin, 2011. I would
like to thank my family for supporting me indefinitely, Steve Daly for believing in me
and my writing, and Andy and Vicki Kossover for inspiring me to become the kind of
high-caliber attorney that they both embody.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In England, the loser pays.' At the end of English litigation, the
non-prevailing party is responsible for all of the prevailing party's
litigation-related expenses and fees.2 The United States, however,
follows the "American Rule," whereby each party is generally
responsible for its own costs. 3 Exceptions to the "American Rule ' 4 are
found in 28 U.S.C. § 19205 ("Section 1920"), which enumerates six types
6of costs that a court can require a non-prevailing party to pay.
1. See Herbert M. Kritzer, "Loser Pays" Doesn't, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Nov.-Dec.
2005), http://bit.ly/VDVyml. The rationale for England's system is to encourage fairness
and efficiency, and to discourage plaintiffs from filing frivolous lawsuits. Id.
2. See id. Canada also uses this model. Id
3. See id.
4. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the American Rule as
"[t]he general policy that all litigants, even the prevailing one, must bear their own
attorney's fees").
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2006 & Supp. 1 2008).
6. See id. The statute includes:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded
transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements
for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making
copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the
case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6) Compensation of court
appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses,
and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.
Id. Attorney fees may also be awarded in certain situations, although these costs are not
included in Section 1920. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)-(c) (2006) (awarding attorney
and expert fees in civil rights cases).
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Requiring the non-prevailing party to pay fees to the prevailing
party has become increasingly desirable, especially because American
court costs have increased astronomically since 2000. 7 In addition to
negligible Section 1920 costs typically awarded to the prevailing party
8
at the end of the litigation--costs such as clerk fees and printing fees,
among other things-U.S. federal courts are now awarding costs for
various e-discovery processes.9 The United States' court costs model is
designed to encourage settlements and allow parties with limited
resources to file lawsuits, even when they are unsure about their chances
of prevailing. 10 But by awarding costs beyond those contemplated by
Section 1920,11 courts have disrupted a common expectation in litigation
and have turned their backs on a major tenant of our legal system.
The court costs problem begins with discovery, a familiar stage of
litigation in which parties exchange information about the lawsuit at
hand.12 Electronic discovery, or e-discovery, is a recent term coined to
express the modern reality that the majority of information used in
discovery is stored electronically. 13  With the rise of technology,
companies and individuals alike have used e-mail, hard drives, databases,
and clouds to store their important documents. 14 When litigation looms,
the electronically stored information (ESI) must be sifted through, sorted,
and provided to the opposing party.' 5 Discovery production has changed
7. See, e.g., Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. (Race Tires 1), No.
2:07-cv-1294, 2011 WL 1748620, at *3, *12 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011) (awarding over
$367,000 in e-discovery costs alone), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir.
2012).
8. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 98 (defining the "American
Rule" and by its inclusion suggesting that awarding little or no costs to either party is
standard practice).
9. See, e.g., Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. (Race Tires 11), 674
F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that file conversion during e-discovery applies
under Section 1920(4)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012); BDT Products, Inc. v.
Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that electronic imaging
during e-discovery applies under Section 1920(4)), abrogated by Taniguchi v. Kan Pac.
Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012).
10. See W. Russell Taber 1I, Bending the American Rule: 'Pullman' Decision
Allows Third-Party Litigation Expenses in Tennessee, TENN. B.J., Aug. 2010, at 10, 10-
11, available at http://bit.ly/18BpxRi.
11. See Race Tires 1, 2011 WL 1748620, at *4 (noting that "the court has wide
latitude to award costs, so long as the costs are enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920")
(emphasis added).
12. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 533 (defining discovery as
"compulsory disclosure, at a party's request, of information that relates to the litigation").
13. See The Basics: What Is E-Discovery?, COMPLETE DISCOVERY SOURCE,




PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 118:1
from pulling files from a cabinet 16 to hiring outside counsel 17 and
experts 8 to use advanced search technology. 19
The amount of ESI in the United States doubles every 18-24
months, 20 and 90 percent of U.S. corporations are currently engaged in
some kind of litigation. 2' These factors, combined with the new way we
store our information,22 have turned discovery into a complicated and
expensive process.23
To manage the large costs associated with e-discovery, parties can
attempt to shift or limit their expenses. 24  One method of shifting e-
discovery costs is through Section 1920.25 Recall that Section 1920 only
allows courts to "tax '26 six kinds of expenses as court costs. 27 Federal
16. See Race Tires 1, 2011 WL 1748620, at *6 (suggesting that "[t]he terms
[']exemplification' and [']copying' originated in and were developed in the world of
paper") (quoting Kellogg Brown & Root Intl, Inc. v. Altanmia Commercial Mktg. Co.,
No. H-07-2684, 2009 WL 1457632, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2009))).
17. See Jeff Blumenthal, Drinker Biddle Law Firm Starts Up E-Discovery
Subsidiary, PHILA. Bus. J. (Oct. 12, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://bit.ly/YadNA4 (noting that
"[m]ost large law firms have e-discovery practices"). This raises the question: whether
hiring outside counsel is necessary to effectively engage in e-discovery. See Ralph
Losey, Can High School Students Review E-Discovery Documents?, LAW TECH. NEWS
(July 23, 2012), http://bit.ly/Yb82Sv (describing an experiment in which high school
students performed work comparable to that of professional e-discovery review services).
18. See E-Discovery Is Big Business, WIRED (Jan. 29, 2006), http://bit.ly/K9cqj5
(noting that the e-discovery market is worth close to $2 billion and growing at an annual
rate of 35 percent).
19. See, e.g., Revolutionary Predictive Coding, RECOMMIND, http://bit.ly/13JQEt6
(last visited Sept. 3, 2013) (offering services of predictive coding, a process mixing
human review with advanced software).
20. See Ben Kerschberg, The Demise of Electronic Discovery's Per-Gigabyte Price
Model, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2011, 9:36 AM), http://onforb.es/qDlgfF.
21. See E-Discovery Is Big Business, supra note 18.
22. See id (crediting the increase of e-discovery to the "inexpensive abundance of
data storage").
23. See, e.g., Race Tires I, No. 2:07-cv-1294, 2011 WL 1748620, at *3, *12 (W.D.
Pa. May 6, 2011) (taxing over $360,000 in e-discovery costs alone), aff'd in part, vacated
inpart, 674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2012).
24. See, e.g., FED. R Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (allowing a party to not produce ESI that is
"not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost"); id. 26(c)(1) (providing
protective orders to exclude discovery that would lead to "annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense") (emphasis added); Kerschberg, supra note 20
(suggesting that new pricing models could drive down e-discovery costs). Methods of
shiffing or managing e-discovery costs other than through Section 1920 are outside the
scope of this Comment.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2006 & Supp. 112008).
26. The statute and this Comment use the legal term "tax," meaning the process of
examining and assessing the costs of a case. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note
4, at 1598 (defining taxation of costs as "the process of fixing the amount of litigation-
related expenses that a prevailing party is entitled to be awarded," not the common
definition of paying the Internal Revenue Service).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
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Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)2" ("Rule 54") allows courts to award
these court costs to the prevailing party.
29
Together, Section 1920 and Rule 54 create a method for shifting
expenses and, more importantly, awarding e-discovery costs to the
opposing party. The prevailing party submits a bill of costs to the
court,30 and the judge will decide which expenses are allowable as costs
under Section 1920.31 Then, the non-prevailing party is responsible for
the taxed Costs.
32
Shifting costs using this method may be effective for parties
because courts have generally interpreted Section 1920(4) broadly to
include certain e-discovery tasks.33 The U.S. Courts of Appeals,
however, are split over how far judges should go in applying Section
1920(4) to e-discovery costs. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits interpret
the statute broadly, 34 while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit interprets it narrowly. 35 There are many complicated tasks
associated with e-discovery 36 and not all of them should be awarded as
court costs under the language of Section 1920. As the court in In re
Ricoh Company, Patent Litigation37 ("Ricoh") aptly noted, "whether a
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1).
29. See id. ("Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise,
costs-other than attorney's fees-should be allowed to the prevailing party.").
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (instructing that "[a] bill of costs shall be filed in the
case").
31. See id. (instructing that "upon allowance, [a bill of costs shall be] included in the
judgment or decree").
32. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) ("Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court
order provides otherwise, costs-other than attorney's fees-should be allowed to the
prevailing party."). Section 1920 is a statute that "provides otherwise."
33. See In re Ricoh Co., Patent Litig., 661 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("In the
era of electronic discovery, courts have held that electronic production can constitute
'exemplification' or 'making copies' under section 1920(4)."). See, e.g., Race Tires II,
674 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that file conversion during e-discovery applies
under Section 1920(4)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012); BDT Products, Inc. v.
Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that electronic scanning
and imaging during e-discovery applies under Section 1920(4)), abrogated by Taniguchi
v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012).
34. See BDT Products, 405 F.3d at 420; Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416,
429 (7th Cir. 2000).
35. See Race Tires H, 674 F.3d at 171. The Eleventh Circuit has applied Section
1920(4) narrowly, but has not ruled directly on the issue. See Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v.
MPW Indus. Servs., Inc., 249 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001) (using a narrow
definition of "exemplification").
36. See, e.g., In re Online DVD Rental Antitrust Litig., No. M 09-2029 PJH, 2012
WL 1414111, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012) (demonstrating the use of TIFF, or Tagged
Image File Format, conversions in e-discovery).
37. InreRicoh Co., Patent Litig., 661 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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particular expense falls within the purview of Section 1920, and thus
must be taxed in the first place, is an issue of statutory interpretation.
38
Interpreting Section 1920 in the context of e-discovery costs is
especially difficult because the U.S. Supreme Court has provided little
guidance on the issue.39 The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled directly
on applying Section 1920(4) to e-discovery costs, but in May 2012, the
Court endorsed a narrow reading of another portion of Section 1920 and
the statute as a whole in Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.
40
Using Section 1920 to limit e-discovery costs may sound like a
perfect solution to the problem of burdensome e-discovery expenses, at
least for prevailing parties. The reality, however, is that courts have
gone too far in expanding Section 1920(4) to encompass e-discovery
costs. 4 1 Section 1920 should continue as a tool to shift costs, but courts
should limit the statutory interpretation analysis to specifically adhere to
the text of the statute.
This Comment will argue that only minimal e-discovery costs
should be taxable under Section 1920(4). Part II of this Comment will
describe the current state of the circuit split regarding Section 1920(4).
Part III will review the Taniguchi case, which found that Section 1920
should be interpreted narrowly and that court costs should be minimal. 42
Part III will also explain how the dicta and policy concerns in Taniguchi
apply to the issue of interpreting e-discovery costs under Section 1920.
Part IV will analyze Taniguchi's impact on e-discovery jurisprudence
and propose a test for use in future cases, focusing on the statute's
language and the policy of the American Rule. This Comment will
suggest that the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly limit the reading of
Section 1920(4). 43 Parties should avoid using Section 1920(4) as a tool
to limit e-discovery costs and should instead organize their ESI,
anticipate litigation, and utilize procedural techniques.
38. Id. at 1364.
39. But see Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012) (providing
guidance on a separate provision in Section 1920).
40. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012) (interpreting 28
U.S.C. § 1920(6) and noting that "taxable costs are limited by statute and are modest in
scope," suggesting a narrow interpretation for Section 1920 as a whole).
41. See, e.g., Race Tires I, No. 2:07-cv-1294, 2011 WL 1748620, at *3, *12 (W.D.
Pa. May 6, 2011) (affirming taxable e-discovery costs of over $367,000).
42. See Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2006 (describing court costs as minimal).
43. Alternatively, Congress could amend the statute a second time to create more
specific language in Section 1920. This Comment, however, cautions against amending
the statute because of the difficulties of naming e-discovery processes in the statute due
to the continuously advancing nature of technology.
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II. BACKGROUND: THE E-DISCOVERY TAXABLE COST DEBATE
Section 1920 enumerates a list of items that can be taxed as costs to
the non-prevailing party.44 Congress chose to restrict court costs by
specifically listing only six items in the taxable costs statute.45 One of
the six items, found in Section 1920(4), allows costs for "[flees for
exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where
the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case." 46 Courts have
found that certain types of e-discovery tasks47 are taxable because they
fall within the language of Section 1920(4). 8
The different tasks involved in e-discovery occur during the three
main stages of the e-discovery process: collection, review, and
processing.49 The parties' first step, collection, is to search for relevant
ESI on computers, networks, databases, and other storage devices. 50
Next, during the review stage, 51 the parties evaluate the ESI to determine
if a party must produce and disclose the information. 52 Finally, the
parties process the ESI during the third stage and present it to opposing
counsel in the agreed-upon format.53 Tasks from each of the three stages
of e-discovery may be included in a bill of costs 54 and will be taxed if the
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2006 & Supp. 1 2008) (including only six items).
45. See id. (evidencing the intent to limit taxable courts by outlining specific and
limited items that can be taxed).
46. Id. § 1920(4).
47. The different "tasks" of e-discovery include activities from each of the three
stages as well as activities within the same stage. For example, conversion of a file's
format and document imaging may both fall under the production stage of ESI, but are
two distinct types of e-discovery that courts have taxed as costs.
48. See, e.g., Race Tires II, 674 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that file
conversion during e-discovery applies under Section 1920(4)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
233 (2012); BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005)
(finding that electronic scanning and imaging during e-discovery applies under Section
1920(4)), abrogated by Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012).
49. See NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
WHERE THE MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY, at xiv (2012), available at http://bit.ly/l2zFvE.
50. See id.
51. See id. (noting that the review stage makes up 73 percent of costs). The first two
stages are expensive because most parties choose to buy software, pay in-house
employees, or hire vendors and outside counsel to complete these tasks. Id.
52. See id. (noting that privileged information must not be produced).
53. See id. A simple example of the processing stage is converting a Microsoft
Word document into a PDF so the opposing party can easily access the information. See
The Basics: What Is E-Discovery?, supra note 13. The degree of difficulty in and price
associated with converting documents is dependent on the requested format.
54. See, e.g., Bill of Costs,. U.S. CTS., httpJ/1.usa.gov/UYMjQf (last visited Sept. 3,
2013) (providing an example of a bill of costs).
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judge determines these costs are appropriate under the language of
Section 1920(4)."5
The Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act
56
changed Section 1920(4)'s language in 2008 to reflect the realities of
modern discovery processes. 57 The amendment changed the language,
"copies of papers," in Section 1920(4) to "copies of any materials., 58
The current provision allows for "[flees for exemplification and the costs
of making copies of any materials where copies are necessarily obtained
for use in the case." 59
The amendment is responsible for "making [ESI] coverable in court
costs."6 Congress's intent was to update Section 1920(4) to reflect the
modern realities of communication and file storage.6' Congress may
have amended the statute to signal its general support of larger court
costs. 62  More likely, however, Congress was simply updating the
language of the statute to reflect the shift from paper to ESI. 63 Nothing
in the legislative history of the amendment demonstrates a view on how
large or minimal court costs should be,64 so the policy arguments in
Taniguchi are particularly persuasive.65
The troublesome trend of applying Section 1920(4) to e-discovery
costs can be visualized in four distinct stages. In the first stage,
beginning in 2000 and lasting a decade, courts saw an increase in taxable
e-discovery cost cases and began applying the language of Section
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2006 & Supp. 11 2008) ("A bill of costs shall be filed in the
case and, upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree.").
56. Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-406, § 6, 122 Stat. 4291, 4292 (2008).
57. See 154 CONG. REc. H10270-71 (Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep. Lofgren)
(reflecting this motivation for amending Section 1920(4)).
58. Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act § 6.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (emphasis added).
60. See 154 CONG. REc. H10271 (Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep. Lofgren).
61. See id. at H10271-72 (noting that the bill's inclusion of ESI would increase the
efficiency of the judicial branch).
62. See, e.g., In re Ricoh Co., Patent Litig., 661 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(reasoning that the purpose of the amendment was to reflect the idea that all ESI can be
recoverable as costs). But see Race Tires 11, 674 F.3d 158, 170 (3d Cir. 2012)
(emphasizing that even with the amendment, the statute still requires the materials to be
copied), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).
63. See Mann v. Heckler & Koch Def., Inc., No. 1:08cv611 (JCC), 2011 WL
1599580, at *9 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2011) ("[The amendment] perhaps indicates legislative
openness towards taxation of copies of things besides paper, but it still requires
copying.").
64. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REc. H10270-71 (Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep.
Lofgren).
65. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012) (describing
court costs as minor).
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1920(4) to e-discovery tasks. 66 In 2011, an unprecedented award of e-
discovery court costs of over $367,000 in Race Tires American, Inc. v.
Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. ("Race Tires p')67 sparked the second stage:
rapid growth of e-discovery court costs through the application of
Section 1920(4) to e-discovery costs. 68 The third stage commenced in
2012 when the Third Circuit attempted to put a stop to excessive court
costs 69 by remedying the lower court's decision in Race Tires I with
Race Tires of America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. ("Race Tires
J/). 70 The fourth stage is yet to come, but undecided courts will likely
limit Section 1920(4) by following the textualist approach of Race Tires
II. Eventually, if Congress does not intervene first, the U.S. Supreme
Court should decide the issue and echo the preference for minimal court
costs articulated in Taniguchi.
71
A. Stage One: The Realization of2000-2010
Beginning in 2000, federal courts ruled on the issue of taxable e-
discovery costs with increasing frequency. 72  Courts previously
interpreted the language of Section 1920(4) during a time of paper
documents 73 and thus the language of the statute was less disputed. As
66. See, e.g., Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir. 2009) (reading
conversion of computer data into readable format into the statute); BDT Products, Inc. v.
Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 416, 420 (6th Cir. 2005) (reading electronic scanning
and imaging into the statute), abrogated by Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S.
Ct. 1997 (2012).
67. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. (Race Tires 1), No. 2:07-cv-
1294, 2011 WL 1748620 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011) (affirming a "significant" award of
costs attributable to e-discovery), affd in part, vacated in part, 674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir.
2012).
68. See John M. Barkett, Un-taxing E-Discovery Costs: Section 1920(4) After Race
Tire Amer. Inc. and Taniguchi, Ass'N CERTIFIED E-DIscOVERY SPECIALISTS, June 2012,
at 1, 2, available at http://bit.ly/lajSn9Q (suggesting that Race Tires I sparked a
"tsunami" of broad decisions).
69. Race Tires II, 674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).
70. See id. at 171 (reducing the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania's award of e-discovery costs).
71. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012).
72. See, e.g., Cefalu v. Viii. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 429 (7th Cir. 2000). In
2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the first court of appeals
to decide the taxable e-discovery costs issue. The rise in popularity of these cases was
likely due to the increase in ESI at the time. See Wendy R. Liebowitz, Digital Discovery
Starts to Work, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 2002, at 1, 4 (estimating that 93 percent of all
information generated was in digital form in 1999).
73. See Race Tires I, No. 2:07-cv-1294, 2011 WL 1748620, at *6 (W.D. Pa. May 6,
2011) ("The terms [']exemplification' and [']copying' originated in and were developed
in the world of paper. One issue is how to apply these § 1920 terms to the world of
electronically stored information." (quoting Kellogg Brown & Root Int'l, Inc. v. Altanmia
Commercial Mktg. Co., No. H-07-2684, 2009 WL 1457632, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 26,
2009))), affd inpart, vacated inpart, 674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2012).
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ESI became more prevalent, 74 litigation emerged to test the boundaries of
what could be considered an "exemplification" or a "copy" in this new
age of technology. 75 The following cases provide a broad sweep of the
taxable e-discovery costs debate during the early years and are by no
means an exhaustive list of cases that decided the issue.
In 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided
the first major case on e-discovery taxable costs. In Cefalu v. Village of
Elk Grove,76 the court expanded the applicability of Section 1920(4) by
using a broad definition of the term "exemplification" in the statute.77
The court reasoned that "exemplification" should include illustrative aids
78in situations where such aids are necessary to convey information. The
court discounted the narrow definition of "exemplification" found in
Webster's Dictionary and instead used a common definition. 79 The court
concluded that creating a multimedia presentation during discovery
might be taxable under the broader, common definition of
"exemplification., 80 The court remanded the case for the lower court to
determine if the presentation could be taxable under Section 1920(4).81
Alternatively, in Kohus v. Toys "R'" Us, Inc., 82 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit defined "exemplification" narrowly,
noting that Congress chose the phrase "exemplification" and did not use
a broader phrase, such as "demonstrative evidence," in Section
1920(4).83 The Kohus court rejected costs associated with a video
exhibit because the exhibit fell outside the court's definition of
"exemplification. 84
In 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit expanded
Section 1920(4) by broadly interpreting the words "copies" and
"exemplification., 85 In BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International,
74. See Kerschberg, supra note 20 (noting that "the amount of electronically stored
information ... now doubles every 18-24 months").
75. See James M. Evangelista, Polishing the "Gold Standard" on the E-Discovery
Cost-Shifting Analysis: Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 2
(2004) (estimating that 95 percent of all documents created in 2004 were created
electronically).
76. Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 2000).
77. See id. at 427 (embracing "the more expansive definition of 'exemplification').
78. See id. at 428.
79. See id, at 427.
80. See id at 429.
81. See Cefalu, 211 F.3d at 429 (vacating the denial of an award of costs and
remanding to determine if the presentation constitutes exemplification).
82. Kohus v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 282 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
83. See id. at 1359.
84. See id. (ruling that a video exhibit could not be taxed under Section 1920(4)
because a court cannot "exceed the limits of this statute").
85. See BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005),
abrogated by Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012).
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Inc.,86 the court affirmed an award of costs that included expenses from
electronic scanning and imaging.87 The Sixth Circuit found that the
district court had reasonably interpreted the statute because electronic
scanning and imaging can be considered "copying., 8 8 In the reasoning,
the court gave deference to the lower court's "broad" discretion.89 The
decision also suggested that the large size of the lawsuit justified a bigger
award of costs.9°
"Copies" under Section 1920(4) was further interpreted broadly in
Hecker v. Deere & Co.,91 a 2009 decision from the Seventh Circuit.
92
The case reasoned that "converting computer data into [a] readable
format" constituted making a copy, but the court did not reference a
definition. 93 Instead, the court ruled that the costs of the conversion were
taxable because the lower court did not abuse its broad discretion in
interpreting Section 1920.94
B. Stage Two: The Frenzy of 2011
In 2011, the prevailing trend of reading Section 1920(4) broadly
continued at an even more rapid pace.95 In Race Tires I, the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania affirmed the Clerk of
Court's award of over $367,000 in e-discovery costs, 9 6 sparking a rush of
similar decisions.97
Race Tires I recognized that "e-discovery has become a necessary
and sometimes costly function of civil litigation." 98 The court relied on
persuasive precedent that described e-discovery tasks as necessary
because the average lawyer cannot complete such technical tasks. 99
86. BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 2005),
abrogated by Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012).
87. See id. at 416, 420.
88. See id. at 420.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009).
92. See id. at 591.
93. See id Cf Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2003 (2012)
(using Webster's Dictionary to define "interpretation").
94. See Hecker, 556 F.3d at 591.
95. See Barkett, supra note 68 (suggesting that Race Tires I sparked a "tsunami" of
broad decisions).
96. Race Tires I, No. 2:07-cv-1294, 2011 WL 1748620, at *3, *12 (W.D. Pa. May 6,
2011), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2012).
97. See, e.g., In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 817 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Pa. 2011)
(similarly interpreting Section 1920(4) broadly and taxing a large award of costs).
98. See Race Tires 1, 2011 WL 1748620, at *1.
99. See id. at *8 (relying on reasoning from CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path,
Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1380-81 (N.D. Ga. 2009)). The CBTFlint Partners case was
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Furthermore, the Race Tires I decision noted that other courts have found
that third-party vendors and electronic scanning of documents are the
"modem-day equivalent[s] of exemplification and copies of paper."100
Ultimately, the court taxed the fees paid to a third-party vendor for
creating electronic documents for discovery. 10'
After Race Tires I, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania continued expanding the breadth and quantity of court
costs. In In re Aspartame Antitrust Litigation,10 2 the court granted
awards of $120,364, $195,398, and $194,375 to the three defendants.
10 3
The court demonstrated a strong preference for e-discovery technology,
especially in complex cases, arguing that ESI lends efficiency and cost-
effectiveness to lawsuits.' °4  The court ultimately granted the three
defendants costs for tasks ranging from "the creation of a litigation
database" to imaging hard drives and keyword searches.' 05 The court
focused on the second half of Section 1920(4)106 to justify these awards,
arguing that these tasks were necessary and essential under Section
1920(4). 107
Notably, In re Aspartame "dr[e]w the line" at an e-discovery
program that was for the mere convenience of counsel. 108 The court
reasoned that the program, a document review tool, went beyond the
essential tasks of keyword searching and filtering and therefore was not
"necessary" under Section 1920(4).109
In the same year, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia in Mann v. Heckler" also addressed the issue presented in In re
Aspartame]"' of whether the creation of documents could constitute
copies. In Mann, the court described scanning as "more akin to copying"
than conversions and drew a useful distinction between "copying" and
later vacated by the Federal Circuit. See CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc.,
654 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
100. Race Tires I, 2011 WL 1748620, at *7 (quoting Brown v. McGraw-Hill Cos.,
Inc., 526 F. Supp. 2d 950 (N.D. Iowa 2007)).
101. See id at * l1l.
102. In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 817 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
103. See id. at 623.
104. See id. at 615.
105. See id.
106. "RW]here the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920 (2006 & Supp. 1 2008).
107. See In re Aspartame, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 615 ("Searchable documents are
essential in a case of this complexity and benefit all parties.").
108. See id at 616.
109. See id.
110. Mann v. Heckler & Koch Def., Inc., No. 1:08cv611 (JCC), 2011 WL 1599580,
at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2011).
111. See In re Aspartame, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 615 (allowing costs for the creation of a
litigation database).
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"creating."'" 2  The Mann court did not allow costs for a litigation
database that created electronically searchable documents" 3 because the
court did not view creation as "copying."'1 4 The distinction between
"scanning," or converting paper documents to ESI, and "creating"
electronic documents is one potential way to delimit the contours of the
definition of "copy."
Mann additionally decided the issue of whether certain paper copies
could be taxed." 5 The court reasoned that copies made merely for the
convenience of parties did not meet the "necessary" test in Section
1920(4).116 The Mann court refused to tax $2,303 in copying costs
incurred by an outside vendor because the defendant could not prove that
the copies were "necessary." ' 17  The court further clarified that for
outside copies to be necessary, they must be furnished to the court or
counsel, or be used as a court exhibit.' 18
C Stage Three: The Wisdom of 2012
After the Race Tires I district court decision, Race Tires of America
appealed on the issue of which e-discovery expenses were taxable
costs. " 9 On appeal, the Third Circuit significantly reduced the giant
Race Tires I cost award. 20 Race Tires I shaped the circuit split over the
interpretation of Section 1920(4) because it was the first time a U.S.
court of appeals limited e-discovery tasks using the language of the
statute. Moreover, Race Tires II addressed the issue using a structured
and reasonable approach, making its logic easy to follow.
The Race Tires II court began its analysis with the text of Section
1920(4) and explicitly applied definitions to the e-discovery tasks in the
case.121 More often than not, prior to Race Tires II, courts applied the
language of Section 1920(4) based on what they felt constituted a "copy"
or an "exemplification.' ' 22  Such analysis creates potential for
112. See Mann, 2011 WL 1599580, at *8 (crediting this distinction to Fells v.
Virginia Dep't of Transp., 605 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Va. 2009)).
113. See id at *9 ("[F]ederal courts cannot 'exceed the limitations explicitly set out in
[Section 1920] without plain evidence of congressional intent"' (citing Fells, 605 F.
Supp. 2d 740)).
114. See id.
115. See id. at *6.
116. See id
117. See Mann, 2011 WL 1599580, at *1, *7.
118. Seeid at*6.
119. Race Tires 11, 674 F.3d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233
(2012).
120. See id at 171.
121. See id at 166.
122. See, e.g., Mann, 2011 WL 1599580, at *8 (describing scanning as "more akin to
copying" but failing to explain why).
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irreconcilable discord between the jurisdictions. A structured, common
method of interpretation is needed to promote consistency in future
Section 1920 decisions.
The Race Tires II majority reduced the cost award by limiting the
number of e-discovery tasks that constituted "copies" under Section
1920(4).123 In its reasoning, the Third Circuit used Webster's Dictionary
to define a "copy" as an "imitation, transcript, or imitation of an original
work."' 124  Based on this definition, the court disallowed costs for
expenses arising out of keyword searches in the collection stage because
no imitations were made. 25  The court ruled that these tasks did not
constitute copies. 1
26
The court did find, however, that two processes-the scanning of
documents to create digital copies and the conversion of files to the
agreed upon format-could be considered "copying" under the plain
meaning of the word. 127 The court affirmed the portion of the district
court's cost award that was incurred by these tasks. 128  The Third
Circuit's plain definition of "copies" appropriately encompasses some e-
discovery tasks while not abusing Section 1920(4). 129 As a result of the
court's limitation, e-discovery costs fell from over $367,000 awarded by
the district court to a more reasonable award of $30,370.130
The Race Tires II decision is significant because of its potential
impact on the future of the taxable e-discovery costs debate. By
employing a specific approach to the issue, Race Tires II provided a
roadmap for other courts to decide similar issues in the same
straightforward manner. The first case after Race Tires II notably
declined to follow the Third Circuit's reasoning, and instead placed a
greater emphasis on the broad discretion the lower courts have in
interpreting Section 1920.131 The Race Tires H decision, however, could
123. See Race Tires I, 674 F.3d at 171.
124. Id. at 166 (quoting WEBSTER'S TimRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 405 (3d
ed. 1993)).
125. See id. at 167.
126. See id.
127. See id at 160.
128. See Race Tires 11, 674 F.3d at 160 (noting that the expenses for these activities
"amount[ed] to approximately $30,000 of the more than $365,000 in electronic discovery
charges taxed in this case").
129. See id. at 167. The Comment's author argues that abuse of the statute occurs
when courts expand Section 1920(4) beyond its textual meaning and intended purpose.
130. See id. at 171-72.
131. See In re Online DVD Rental Antitrust Litig., No. M 09-2029 PJH, 2012 WL
1414111, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012) (noting that although Race Tires 11 was well-
reasoned, the lower court's broad construction of the statute was appropriate and there
was no reason to disrupt it).
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persuade other courts to make decisions that narrowly and correctly
interpret Section 1920(4).
Hoosier Racing Tire Corporation, the party in Race Tires II whose
award of costs was reduced by $95,210,132 petitioned for a writ of
certiorari on June 14, 2012.133 The U.S. Supreme Court denied the
request on October 1, 2012.134 Because vast differences exist among the
Courts of Appeals regarding the interpretation of Section 1920(4),
however, the taxable e-discovery cost issue is ripe for U.S. Supreme
Court review.
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN: THE TANIGUCHI DECISION
The Third Circuit may have restrained Section 1920(4),135 but
without a U.S. Supreme Court directive, other circuits are free to
continue in the same, unrestricted manner. 136 The U.S. Supreme Court
has never ruled directly on the issue of taxable e-discovery costs under
Section 1920(4). In May 2012, however, the Court provided insight
through Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd. In Taniguchi, the Court
demonstrated a preference for a narrow interpretation of Section 1920
and supported a policy of minimal court costs.
13 7
The Taniguchi Court interpreted a separate provision of the statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1920(6).138 The issue was whether costs associated with
translating the language of documents were taxable under Section
1920(6), which allows costs for "compensation of interpreters.' 3 9 In its
reasoning, the Court defined "interpretation" using Webster's Dictionary
and common usage. 140  The Court concluded that "interpretation"
included only oral translation, so the written translations of documents
were not taxable as costs under the statute. 14'
The Taniguchi Court's dicta and policy concerns 42 are transferable
to the broader e-discovery issue in future cases. For example, the Court
132. See Race Tires ll, 674F.3dat 171.
133. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. v. Race Tires Am.,
Inc., No. 11-1520 (U.S. June 14, 2012), 2012 WL 2363410.
134. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. v. Race Tires Am., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012)
(mem.).
135. See Race Tires 11, 674 F.3d at 171 (limiting the interpretation of the language of
1920(4)).
136. But see Barkett, supra note 68 (arguing that other courts will likely follow the
reasoning in Race Tires II).
137. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2004, 2006 (2012).
138. See id. at 2000 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6)).
139. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) (2006).
140. See Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2003-04.
141. See id. at 2005.
142. See id. at 2006 (commenting on taxable costs in general under Section 1920, not
limited to translation costs).
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described taxable costs in general as "relatively minor, incidental
expenses" that are narrow in scope. 143 As evidence for this conclusion,
the Court cited the entire statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and did not
specifically limit the description to Section 1920(6),'44 suggesting that all
court costs should be minimal.
The Court's preference for minimal court costs was partially based
on the burden and inequity of requiring the non-prevailing party to bear
exorbitant costs. 145  Such large costs could discourage a party from
bringing a lawsuit or punish a party for extensive discovery requests. 146
Smaller, incidental taxable costs may prevent these unfavorable policy
concerns. 1
47
In the wake of Taniguchi, federal courts should acknowledge that
the vast application of Section 1920(4) to e-discovery costs will
inevitably decline. 148 Scholars have argued that the U.S. Supreme Court,
whether intentionally or not, endorsed the Third Circuit's Race Tires II
rationale with the Taniguchi decision. 149 Ideally, other courts will follow
the Race Tires H reasoning because the U.S. Supreme Court endorses its
approach.
The U.S. Supreme Court's message in Taniguchi may not have been
forceful enough to curb the e-discovery tsunami, however. Taniguchi
may have suggested an endorsement of Race Tires J,150 but the U.S.
Supreme Court did not create binding e-discovery precedent. For real
change, the Court must specifically mandate a uniform test for
interpreting Section 1920(4).
IV. THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN'
Outside the Third Circuit, courts have referenced the well-reasoned
Race Tires 11 decision to support a narrow reading of Section 1920(4). 151
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2006-07.
146. See id. at 2007.
147. See id. (suggesting that plaintiffs with limited resources might be "unjustly
discouraged" from bringing actions because of high costs (citing Fleischmann Distilling
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967))).
148. See Barkett, supra note 68, at 7 (arguing that the Race Tires H rationale "likely
will be" followed by other circuits).
149. See id. at 8.
150. See id
151. See, e.g., Finnerty v. Stiefel Labs., Inc., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1321 (S.D. Fla.
2012) (reducing e-discovery taxable costs in part and noting that under Race Tires II, not
"all steps that lead up to the production of copies of materials are taxable"); Country
Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-326-BR, 2012 WL
3202677, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 2012) (deciding that "[b]ecause the Third Circuit's
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Because some courts have ignored the guidance of both Race Tires H and
Taniguchi, 5 2 U.S. Supreme Court action remains necessary to return
court costs to their rightful small size. As such, the U.S. Supreme Court
should harmonize the lessons of Taniguchi with the federal jurisprudence
of taxable e-discovery costs to create a uniform judicial test.
A. Recommendation: A Judicial Test
The e-discovery taxable costs cases vary widely in their reasoning,
but no majority approach has surfaced. 153 A judicial test following a
single interpretation of "copy" and "exemplification" would help to
streamline future decisions. Looking solely at the text of Section
1920(4), costs can be awarded for "[flees for exemplification and the
costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily
obtained for use in the case., 154  The use of the word "and" in the
provision shows that the rule applies to both "exemplification" and
"copies."155 The conjunction also shows that the two terms are intended
to be distinct. An additional requirement exists if the item is a copy: that
the copy be "necessarily obtained for use in the case."
156
The following test derives solely from the textual construction of
Section 1920(4). The first prong of the test determines if the item is an
exemplification or a copy. If the item is an exemplification, it should be
taxed as a court cost. If the item is a copy, then the second prong of the
test determines if the copy was necessarily obtained. Finally, the
necessity must relate to the item's use in the case.151
The language of Section 1920(4) seems straightforward, but vast
differences in the rule's application158 reveal that room for discrepancies
exists. To prevent further distortion of Section 1920(4), the U.S.
opinion is well-reasoned and thorough... the court adopts the reasoning of Race Tires
America and will follow its analysis").
152. See, e.g., In re Online DVD Rental Antitrust Litig., No. M 09-2029 PJH, 2012
WL 1414111, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012) (deciding the issue after Race Tires II and
Taniguchi).
153. See, e.g., Race Tires I, 674 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir. 2012) (reasoning that costs
associated with keyword searches and collection of ESI are copies), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 233 (2012); In re Online DVD Rental, 2012 WL 1414111, at *1 (reasoning that costs
associated with professional creation of visual aids can be taxed under broad construction
of Section 1920(4)).




158. See, e.g., Race Tires 11, 674 F.3d at 171 (applying a narrow definition of
"copies" under Section 1920(4)); Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 427 (7th
Cir. 2000) (applying a broad definition of exemplification under Section 1920(4)).
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Supreme Court must both endorse this test and demonstrate how to use
it.
B. The Proposed Test at Work
In demonstrating how to use the proposed test, the U.S. Supreme
Court should clearly explain its two prongs. First, the Court must
articulate how to define the two contested terms in the provision,159
"exemplification" and "copies."1'6  Second, the Court must limit the
discretion available in interpreting the second half of Section 1920(4),
which requires a "copy" to be "necessarily obtained for use in the
case."
161
1. Defining Terms: Exemplification and Copies
The U.S. Supreme Court must narrowly define the words
"exemplification" and "copies" to reduce taxable e-discovery costs. 162
Following the reading of "interpretation" in Taniguchi163 and "copies" in
Race Tires II,164 Section 1920, in its entirety, should be interpreted using
a plain meaning approach.
The proposed test is based on the principle that the language of a
statute is the proper starting point for all statutory interpretation.'
65
Furthermore, the proposed test incorporates dicta from Taniguchi out of
deference to the U.S. Supreme Court's sound reasoning.
The U.S. Supreme Court defined "interpretation" in Taniguchi
using a plain meaning approach. 166 Race Tires II used common usage to
define "copies."'' 67 The textual integrity canon of statutory interpretation
directs courts to "interpret the same or similar terms in a statute ... the
159. See Race Tires II, 674 F.3d at 171 (applying a narrow definition of copies under
Section 1920(4)); Cefalu, 211 F.3d at 427 (applying a broad definition of exemplification
under Section 1920(4)). The terms are contested because courts disagree about how to
interpret them.
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (Supp. 112008).
161. Id.
162. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2004, 2006 (2012)
(implying a goal of minimal court costs by describing them as minor).
163. See id. at 2004.
164. See Race Tires 1l, 674 F.3d at 166.
165. See KATHARINE CLARK & MATTHEW CONNOLLY, A GUIDE TO READING,
INTERPRETING AND APPLYING STATUTES 1 (2006), available at http://bit.ly/I aorlOB ("The
language of the text of the statute should serve as the starting point for any inquiry into its
meaning.").
166. See Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2004.
167. See Race Tires II, 674 F.3d at 166 (using Webster's Dictionary to define
"copies").
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same way."' 168 Thus, the proposed test follows the methods employed by
Race Tires II and Taniguchi, two very sensible cases. The proposed test
begins with the text of Section 1920(4) and uses a reputable dictionary to
ascertain the plain and common meaning of each word. 1
69
The Taniguchi Court explicitly and repeatedly noted that taxable
costs should be relatively minor. 17 0 By declining to limit this statement
to costs under Section 1920(6),171 the U.S. Supreme Court applied the
reasoning to the statute as a whole. The suggested test reflects this
concern by proposing that taxable costs be curtailed. Narrowly defining
the terms in Section 1920(4) achieves the goal of curbing taxable costs.
2. Exemplification
The taxable e-discovery costs cases have interpreted the definition
of "exemplification" in a number of ways. 172 First, courts have blended
the meaning of "exemplification" with the meaning of "copies" in the
statute, finding no significant difference between the two terms. 73 Other
courts have chosen clear stances on what constitutes an
"exemplification." Cefalu, for example, defined "exemplification" very
broadly, as anything that "furthers [an] illustrative purpose of an
exhibit.' 74 Kohus, alternatively, did not consider a video exhibit an
"exemplification" because the language Congress used in Section
1920(4) would have been broader if they intended such an expansive use
of the term. 1
75
With these approaches and the Taniguchi policy in mind, the U.S.
Supreme Court should first reject the notion 176 that "exemplification" and
"copies" are synonymous under Section 1920(4). If Congress had meant
to convey a single, broad category of copies, the language would reflect
168. See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98
GEO. L.J. 341, 368 (2010).
169. See id. at 357 (describing the codified canon of interpretation that instructs the
interpreter to follow the dictionary definition of terms).
170. See Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2006.
171. See id.
172. See, e.g., BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir.
2005) (failing to distinguish exemplification from copies), abrogated by Taniguchi v.
Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012); Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d
416, 428 (7th Cir. 2000) (using a broad definition of exemplification).
173. See, e.g., BDT Products, 405 F.3d at 420 (taxing costs under "exemplification
and copies of papers" without choosing one or distinguishing between the two terms).
174. Cefalu,211 F.3d at 428.
175. Kohus v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 282 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
176. See BDT Products, 405 F.3d at 420 (failing to distinguish between
"exemplification" and "copies").
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that desire with a single, broad word. 177 The distinct language, which
uses an "and" to separate the two terms, shows that the two words are
unique. 178
The broad definition of "exemplification" used in Cefalu seems to
conform most closely to the plain meaning approach of statutory
interpretation. In Taniguchi and Race Tires 11, the statutory language
was defined using Webster's Dictionary.179 "Exemplification" is defined
by Webster's as: "a) the act or process of exemplifying; b) example,
case in point.' 80  Unfortunately, the first definition provided is
unrevealing and the second definition is very broad. Although the plain
meaning approach adheres to the method utilized in Taniguchi and Race
Tires JJ, l8 l the broad dictionary definition of "exemplification" conflicts
with the policy preference for minimal costs articulated in Taniguchi.'
82
The U.S. Supreme Court should instead employ the third approach
to defining "exemplification" using the narrow definition in Kohus.
183
Logically, Congress did not intend to shift costs of producing any
"example"'' I 4 because almost all evidence used in court could constitute
an "example" of a point a party is trying to convey. Such a reading
would yield the absurd result of making the non-prevailing party
responsible for the costs of every point made by both parties at trial. Not
all examples should constitute taxable costs under the language of
Section 1920(4) because inequitable court costs would result. The U.S.
Supreme Court has expressed a belief in minimal court costs, and Section
1920 limits court costs to only six items. The broad Cefalu definition of
"exemplification" would expand court costs beyond their intended
purpose.
Finally, "exemplification" is distinguishable from "translation," the
term defined in Taniguchi. Unlike "translation," "exemplification" is a
legal term with a legal definition. 85 Black's Law Dictionary defines
"exemplification" as "[a]n official transcript of a public record,
177. See Race Tires I, 674 F.3d 158, 165 (3d Cir. 2012) ("We, however, do not think
the terms [copies and exemplification] are interchangeable or synonymous."), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).
178. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (Supp. 1 2008).
179. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2003 (2012); Race
Tires 11, 674 F.3d at 166.
180. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 437 (Frederick C. Mish et al.
eds., 11 th ed. 2007).
181. See Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2003; Race Tires 11, 674 F.3d at 166.
182. See Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2006.
183. See Kohus v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 282 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (arguing
that the definition of "exemplification" should be narrow).
184. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 180, at 437
(defining exemplification as an example).
185. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 653.
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authenticated as a true copy for use as evidence. 186 The definition in
Black's Law Dictionary is more analogous to the narrow definition of
"exemplification" in Kohus.' 87 The definition also fits squarely within
the goal of minimal court costs promoted in Taniguchi188 because the
requirements that an exemplification be "official" and "authorized"
' 189
naturally limit what can be considered. The judicial test proposes use of
Black's Law Dictionary's definition of "exemplification" in the future
because the meaning limits court costs and adheres to the specific
language of the statute.
3. Copies
A second point of contention' 90 in federal courts is how to interpret
the definition of "copies" as used in Section 1920(4).191 Defining
"copies" in the e-discovery context is particularly difficult because of the
technical processes involved. 92 Recall that e-discovery involves three
distinct stages: collection, review, and processing. 193  Courts have
interpreted "copies" to include actions from each of the three stages. 1
94
The following table demonstrates some e-discovery costs that have been
interpreted as "copies" under Section 1920(4). The table also identifies
the stage of e-discovery during which each cost is likely incurred. 195
186. Id.
187. See Kohus, 282 F.3d at 1359 (declining to tax a video exhibit because the phrase
"exemplification" was limited by Congress).
188. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012) (using a
plain meaning approach to the definition and articulating that taxable costs should be
minor).
189. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 653.
190. See, e.g., Race Tires I, 674 F.3d 158, 165 (3d Cir. 2012) (interpreting copies
narrowly under Section 1920(4)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012); BDT Products, Inc.
v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005) (arguing that a broad reading of
copies under 1920(4) is reasonable), abrogated by Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd.,
132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012).
191. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (Supp. H2008).
192. See, e.g., In re Online DVD Rental Antitrust Litig., No. M 09-2029 PJH, 2012
WL 1414111, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012) (deciding whether TIFF, or Tagged Image
File Format, conversion costs were copies).
193. See PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 49.
194. See, e.g., Race Tires 11, 674 F.3d at 171 (finding that file conversion, which
likely occurred during processing, applied under Section 1920(4)); In re Aspartame
Antitrust Litig., 817 F. Supp. 2d 608, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (finding that keyword searches,
which likely occurred during review, applied under Section 1920(4)).
195. Note: These determinations are made by the Comment's author and not by
courts.
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Allowed as Costs under "Copies" Stage of E-Discovery
Electronic scanning and imaging196  Processing
Creation of a litigation database' 97  Reviewing
Keyword searches198  Collection
Scanning and conversion to Processing
agreed-upon format' 99
Consistent with the Taniguchi and Race Tires II method of defining
statutory terms,2 °° the proposed test utilizes Webster's Dictionary.
Webster's Dictionary defines "copy" as "an imitation, transcript, or
reproduction of an original work.",20 1  Similar to "exemplification,"
"copy" is found both in Webster's Dictionary and Black's Law
Dictionary. Unlike the distinct definitions for "exemplification,"
however, the definitions of "copy" are constructively the same in both
sources. Black's Law Dictionary defines "copy" as "[a]n imitation or
reproduction of an original.
2 02
Because the definition of "copies" is generally understood in a
single way, the U.S. Supreme Court cannot promote policy preferences
simply by choosing one definition over the other. Instead, the Court
must draw a line through the broad definition of "copy" to further the
Taniguchi policy of taxing only minimal costs.
203
One way to draw a line through the definition of copies is to
determine in which stage of e-discovery each submitted item in a bill of
costs occurs. The proposed test assumes that "copies" and
196. See BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 416, 420 (6th Cir.
2005), abrogated by Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012).
197. See In re Aspartame, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 615.
198. See id.
199. See Race Tires H, 674 F.3d at 167.
200. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2003 (2012) (using
Webster's Dictionary); Race Tires II, 674 F.3d at 166 (same).
201. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 180, at 276.
202. BLACK'S LAwDICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 385.
203. See Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2004, 2006 (using a plain meaning approach to the
definition and articulating that taxable costs should be minor).
[Vol. 118:1
SHIFTING THE E-DISCOVERY SOLUTION
"exemplifications" are not often made in the first stage of e-discovery,
collection. In this stage, parties sort through ESI 2°4 but likely do not
need to make copies. 20 5 In the second stage-review 206-- the parties may
make copies of relevant documents. °7 Information irrelevant to the case,
however, does not fall under the language of Section 1920(4). The
majority of copies are likely made during the final stage of e-discovery:
processing. Processing involves formatting information for the opposing
party,2°8 such as converting a document. Many copies are likely
produced during this stage.
A second way to draw a line through the broad definition of
"copies" is to characterize the disputed copy as either a scan or a
creation. 0 9 In Mann, the court found that actually "creating" ESI during
discovery, such as preparing a litigation database, does not constitute
making a copy because the document or item did not previously exist.210
A scan, on the other hand, duplicates an existing paper or digital
document.2 1'
Because of Taniguchi's articulated goal of keeping court costs
minimal,212 the proposed test combines the two line-drawing mechanisms
to twice restrict the broad definition of "copies." If the suspect copy
occurs during the collection or review stages of e-discovery, the district
courts should analyze whether the copy is a scan or a creation of
something new. If the copy occurs during the final stage of e-
discovery-processing-the extra determination of scan or creation is
not necessary because there is a larger likelihood that the item is a true
copy.
Whenever a federal court believes an e-discovery task is a "copy," it
should first determine in which stage the task occurs. Unless the copy
occurs in the processing stage, the court should next ensure the copy is
an actual scan and not a creation of something new. Using the above
204. See PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 49.
205. See In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 817 F. Supp. 2d 608, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2011)
(finding that keyword searches, which likely occurred during collection, were taxable
copies). The Comment's author disagrees with this conclusion, instead reasoning that
searching through existing documents yields no copies.
206. See PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 49.
207. See In re Aspartame, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 615 (finding that the creation of a
litigation database, which likely occurred during the review stage, constituted "copying").
The party most likely copied relevant documents onto the database. The cost of creating
the database itself, however, should not be seen as a copy.
208. See PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 49.
209. See Mann v. Heckler & Koch Def., Inc., No. 1:08cv611 (JCC), 2011 WL
1599580, at *8 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2011) (utilizing this distinction).
210. See id.
211. See id. (utilizing this view of a scan).
212. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2004, 2006 (2012).
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chart as an example, keyword searches may occur during the collection
stage. Such searches, however, do not look for anything specific, but
rather only locate existing documents. As such, these keyword searches
are not "copies" as contemplated by Section 1920(4). They are more
similar to creation because the software for the keyword search is
something introduced to the party's ESI. If a district court bases its
determination on these characteristics of copies, such vast discrepancies
in the application of the language will be reduced.
4. Limiting Discretion: How to Demonstrate "Necessarily
Obtained For Use"
After providing narrow definitions for "exemplification" and
"copies," the Court should next attempt to limit the breadth of the second
requirement of the statute. Under Section 1920(4), the second
requirement provides that the copy must be "necessarily obtained for use
in the case.,
213
An overall theme in ruling on the necessity requirement is that
reviewing courts defer to the lower courts' determination of necessity.214
The proposed test will focus on this theme while considering the various
ways taxable e-discovery costs cases have applied the necessity
requirement.
Many courts have interpreted the necessity requirement and agree
that the determination is based on more than just one party's assertion of
what is necessary.215 Under the language of Section 1920(4), a court
must decide if a disputed copy was necessary for use in a case. 216 The
party in Ricoh argued that a "copy" does not actually have to be used in a
trial or record to meet the necessity requirement.217 The Mann court
described the necessity of use requirement as requiring that the copies be
furnished to the court or counsel, or be used as a court exhibit.
218
Finally, the Cefalu court determined necessity based on whether the copy
213. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (Supp. 112008). Note that the language of the statute seems
to exclude exemplification from these two requirements. Id. (noting "where the copies
are necessarily obtained") (emphasis added).
214. See, e.g., Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir. 2009)
(emphasizing this discretion in its reasoning); BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc.,
405 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005) (making a determination based on the discretion of the
district court), abrogated by Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012).
215. See Race Tires I, No. 2:07-cv-1294, 2011 WL 1748620, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 6,
2011), affd in part, vacated in part, 674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2012).
216. See28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).
217. See In re Ricoh Co., Patent Litig., 661 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
218. See Mann v. Heckler & Koch Def., Inc., No. 1:08cv611 (JCC), 2011 WL
1599580, at *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2011).
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was "vital to the presentation of the information, or . . . merely a
convenience or, worse, an extravagance.
'" 219
The Cefalu reasoning provides the most logical way to apply the
necessity requirement while generally reducing e-discovery court costs.
The case's high bar for meeting the necessity test adheres to the U.S.
Supreme Court's reminder in Taniguchi that taxable court costs should
be minimal.220  By requiring that the copy be "vital" and not just
"reasonably necessary,, 221 the proposed test will reduce the e-discovery
tasks that can apply under Section 1920(4).
The proposed test does not determine whether the copy was actually
used in the litigation. Textually, Section 1920(4) requires "use in the
case" and not specifically "use at trial." A "case" is much more
expansive222 than a specific trial.223 Much of the information provided to
the opposing party during discovery is never seen at trial. Requiring the
use of the copy in a trial would frustrate the purpose of Section 1920(4),
which intends to tax certain copies as court costs. 224 If copies had to be
used in trial, many legitimate copies would be excluded from an award
of court costs.
Keeping in mind the desired policy of lowering court costs, the U.S.
Supreme Court should instruct district courts to determine necessity
based on Cefalu's standard: whether the copy was "vital to the
presentation" of the information of the case.225 The limited, strict
language of the test avoids overindulgence in using Section 1920(4) to
tax every e-discovery task. Furthermore, by clarifying that the use
requirement applies to the whole life cycle of the case and not just the
trial, the U.S. Supreme Court will award costs for copies that are
appropriate under 1920(4).
Finally, the Court should emphasize that the phrasing of the statute
ties the necessity requirement to the copy itself and not to the associated
fee. The necessity requirement asks only whether the copy itself is
"necessarily obtained for use in the case,, 226 and not whether the fees or
tasks were necessary. In other words, if the copy is necessary, the price
of making the copy can be taxed. If a party hires outside counsel to
search through their ESI, for example, the costs of hiring the firm may be
219. See Cefalu v. Viii. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 428-29 (7th Cir. 2000).
220. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012).
221. See id. (suggesting this language).
222. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 243 (defining a case as "[a] civil
or criminal proceeding, action, suit, or controversy at law or in equity").
223. See id. at 1644-45 (defining a trial as "[a] formal judicial examination of
evidence and determination of legal claims in an adversary proceeding").
224. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (Supp. 112008).
225. See Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 428-29 (7th Cir. 2000).
226. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).
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necessary for discovery compliance. The determination of whether the
firm costs are necessary, however, is irrelevant. Only the tasks
themselves matter to the necessity requirement. By clarifying the text of
Section 1920(4), the Court will further limit the lower courts' discretion
in applying Section 1920(4).
In sum, the proposed test has two prongs. First, the test suggests
using standard, narrow definitions of the two key words of Section
1920(4), "exemplification" and "copies." "Exemplification" should be
defined using Black's Law Dictionary and the broad, common definition
of "copies" should be limited using e-discovery task characterizations.
Second, the proposed test urges the U.S. Supreme Court to limit the
discretion in applying the second half of Section 1920(4), the necessity
requirement. Under the proposed test, the necessity requirement is
limited to vital copies and the use requirement only requires use in the
case, not the trial. By interpreting the language of Section 1920(4) in a
narrow manner, the proposed test ultimately reduces e-discovery court
costs awards.
V. WHAT TO EXPECT IN STAGE FouR
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the opportunity to decide the issue
of e-discovery taxable costs by denying certiorari in the Race Tires 11
case. Thus, Supreme Court action is unlikely to occur in the near future.
Instead, more federal Courts of Appeals will rule directly on the issue.
Given the detailed and well-respected reasoning 227 in Race Tires 11, some
undecided circuits will follow the Third Circuit's narrow interpretation.
The numerous interpretational approaches to Section 1920(4) make the
future difficult to predict. The only guarantee is that e-discovery taxable
costs cases will continue to occur, and probably will do so more
frequently as technology and the use of e-discovery continue to advance.
Taniguchi is unlikely to sway many courts on the e-discovery issue
until the U.S. Supreme Court expressly connects the decision to e-
discovery. Perhaps when more circuits have made a determination and
the split becomes more pronounced, the U.S. Supreme Court will
recognize the importance of intervention. Until then, federal judges'
varied perceptions of what constitutes a "copy" in the technical context
of e-discovery will continue to shape court costs awards.
227. See, e.g., Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., No. 5:09-
CV-326-BR, 2012 WL 3202677, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 2012) (reasoning that
"[b]ecause the Third Circuit's opinion is well-reasoned and thorough... the court adopts
the reasoning of Race Tires America [Race Tires II] and will follow its analysis").
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